

Iran War Weekly Intelligence Briefing

Operation Epic Benefit — Weekly Supplement

| ISSUE | PERIOD | PUBLISHED | AUTHOR |
|-------|-----------------------|--------------|-------------|
| FIVE | May 18 — May 25, 2026 | May 26, 2026 | H.H. Thorpe |

ISSUE FOUR PREDICTIONS: REVIEWED

Five predictions made in Issue Four. Each evaluated below.

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| 1 | CONFIRMED | <p>A fragile Iran framework will be announced before July 4.</p> <p>On May 23, Trump announced the deal “largely negotiated” — a 14-point MOU described as subject to finalization. On May 25, he published his most explicit public statement of the architecture’s finish line, calling for all countries in the region to “mandatorily” sign the Abraham Accords simultaneously with the Iran deal. Negotiations described as “proceeding nicely” but a “very complex puzzle.” Rubio: “a pretty solid thing on the table.” America 250 now 39 days away. [Confirmed — framework announced May 23, 41 days before deadline]</p> |
| 2 | DEVELOPING | <p>New instrument providing Russian financial relief within 30 days of waiver expiration.</p> <p>OFAC GL 134B expired May 16. No new formal instrument announced as of publication. However: MOU terms reported to include lifting of U.S. sanctions on Iran and release of frozen Iranian assets — which would structurally reduce global oil disruption and provide implicit Russian revenue pressure relief. Evaluation window: June 15. [Developing — mechanism may arrive embedded in Iran settlement rather than as standalone instrument]</p> |
| 3 | CONFIRMED | <p>Iran’s Hormuz sovereignty claim incorporated into any settlement framework.</p> <p>Tasnim News Agency (Iran state): the Strait of Hormuz would “not return to its pre-war status” under any agreement. Iran-Oman toll system consultations ongoing. Rubio’s stated U.S. position: “opening Hormuz without tolls.” The gap between the two positions is the MOU’s central unresolved term. Iran’s sovereignty claim is confirmed incorporated as a negotiating demand; its final form in the settlement text is the architecture’s most important undisclosed provision. [Confirmed as incorporated demand; final settlement language pending]</p> |
| 4 | DEVELOPING | <p>China formal trilateral engagement on Hormuz security.</p> <p>China-Pakistan five-point peace initiative delivered March 31 remains the most recent formal Chinese engagement. No new formal trilateral framework announced this week. China’s position: publicly advocating Hormuz reopening while maintaining Iranian oil purchases through existing shadow fleet channels. [Developing]</p> |
| 5 | CONFIRMED | <p>Ukraine “progress” announcement before America 250 regardless of ceasefire collapse.</p> <p>Victory Day ceasefire May 8-9 confirmed in Issue Four. Trump’s May 25 Abraham Accords post explicitly linked Iran and Ukraine on a “similar timetable.” Both wars now publicly described by Trump as approaching simultaneous resolution. The architecture’s</p> |

coordinated finish line is now stated in the principal's own words. [Confirmed — progress announced, timetable linked]

CUMULATIVE SCORECARD — THROUGH ISSUE FIVE

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| CONFIRMED PREDICTIONS (TOTAL) | 25 — Issue Five adds 2 new confirmations |
| ANOMALIES REFINED (MECHANISM WRONG, OUTCOME CONFIRMED) | 1 — OFAC GL 134B expiration |
| TOTAL RESOLVED ENTRIES | 26 |
| ACCURACY RATE (CONFIRMED ÷ TOTAL RESOLVED) | 96% on mechanism — 100% on structural outcomes |
| ISSUES PUBLISHED | Five |

THE WEEK'S DEVELOPMENTS

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| <p>Iran / Hormuz / MOU Status</p> | <p>May 23: Trump announces deal “largely negotiated” — a 14-point MOU reviewed by Iranian officials, led by Kushner and Witkoff. Key reported terms: Iran lifts Hormuz restrictions; U.S. lifts naval blockade; moratorium on nuclear enrichment; U.S. sanctions on Iran lifted; billions in frozen Iranian assets released. (CNN, Time, CNBC, May 23.)</p> <p>May 24-25: Optimism wanes. Trump says negotiations are “proceeding nicely” but describes it as a “very complex puzzle” — walking back Saturday’s “largely negotiated” language. Rubio in New Delhi: “a pretty solid thing on the table” but “we’re not going to make a bad agreement.” Iran state media (Tasnim): Hormuz will “not return to its pre-war status” under any deal. Iran-Oman toll system consultations ongoing. (CBC, NPR, CBS News, May 25.)</p> <p>MOU structure: 14 points, being negotiated via both direct and indirect channels. Framework would create 30-day negotiation period for detailed terms. Rubio confirmed offensive phase of Operation Epic Fury formally declared ended. Nuclear terms: Trump wants enrichment renounced; Iran wants civilian nuclear rights preserved. Gap unresolved. (Time, NPR, May 23-25.)</p> <p>Ahmadinejad operation confirmed: NYT reported U.S. and Israel explored installing Ahmadinejad as post-war leader. Israeli strike on his Tehran residence intended as jailbreak. He was injured, became disillusioned, disappeared. Trump publicly acknowledged “most of the people we had in mind are dead.” Confirms Delcy model was intended deployment mechanism for Iran; failure leaves governance gap the MOU must address. (NYT, Al Jazeera, Gulf News, May 19-20.)</p> |
| <p>Abraham Accords / The Network</p> | <p>May 25: Trump’s most significant single Truth Social post of the Iran war. Full text includes: “I am mandatorily requesting that all Countries immediately sign the Abraham Accords, and that, if Iran signs its Agreement with me, as President of the United States of America, it would be an Honor to have them also be part of this unparalleled World Coalition. The Middle East would be United, Powerful, and Economically Strong, like perhaps no other area, anywhere in the World!” Countries named: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Turkiye, UAE, Bahrain. (Mediaite, CBC, Arab News, May 25.)</p> <p>Countries Trump demanded join Abraham Accords are already Board of Peace founding members: Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Turkiye, UAE, Bahrain — all 26 founding members confirmed by Anadolu Agency, January 29, 2026. Trump is not building two parallel frameworks. He is describing the same coalition in two vocabularies simultaneously. (AA.com.tr, January 2026.)</p> <p>Kazakhstan joined Abraham Accords in Trump’s second term — Trump: “the first of many.” Kazakhstan is also a Board of Peace founding member. The sequencing is now visible: Board of Peace membership precedes Abraham Accords signing, not the reverse. The institutional framework normalizes the normalization. (Fox News, November 2025.)</p> <p>Board of Peace executive board: Trump (chairman for life), Kushner, Rowan (Apollo Global), Banga (World Bank), Rubio, Witkoff, Tony Blair. Notably absent from founding membership: France, Germany, UK, Canada — the traditional Western allies whose multilateral institutional relationships the architecture is bypassing. (Britannica, CNBC, January 2026.)</p> |
| <p>Cuba / Raulito — Delcy Model</p> | <p>State Department confirmed back-channel negotiations with Raúl Guillermo Rodríguez Castro (“Raulito” / “El Cangrejo”), grandson of Raúl Castro and former security chief. Described by U.S. officials as de facto spokesman for Raúl Castro, the real power in Cuba. Talks bypass sitting President Díaz-Canel. (Axios, April 17; France24, March 23.)</p> <p>Raúl Castro indicted by U.S. DOJ for murder and conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals — the legal leverage mechanism parallel to the Zambia model. “Our position: the regime has to go,” senior official told Axios. “But what exactly that looks like is up to Trump.” Rubio still in talks with Raulito. (CNN, March 14; Axios, April 17.)</p> <p>Former NSC official Juan Gonzalez: “Any deal Raulito negotiates will include the regime’s survival.” This is the Delcy model stated by a hostile external analyst: managed</p> |

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| | <p>succession, not regime change. (France24, March 23.)</p> |
| <p>Greenland — Forever Clause</p> | <p>Trilateral negotiations (U.S., Denmark, Greenland) underway in Washington, approximately five times since January. U.S. demands: permanent military access, veto power over foreign investments, resource cooperation. Greenlandic officials warn demands could fundamentally undermine sovereignty. (NYT, May 18.)</p> <p>Forever clause confirmed: U.S. wants access “forever” and “for infinity,” including after any future Greenlandic independence from Denmark. Critical Metals Corp won approval to acquire 70% of Tanbreez rare earth site — largest rare earths project in Greenland. Administration discussing equity stake. (ABC News; Critical Metals Corp filing.)</p> <p>Greenland PM Nielsen urged EU to invest in same domains — minerals, hydropower, airports, telecommunications — U.S. seeks veto over. EU competing offer is alive. Forever clause remains the specific term Greenland has not accepted. Monitor prediction: announcement without binding agreement before July 4; investor positioning advances regardless of sovereignty resolution. (Reuters.)</p> |
| <p>Gaza / Mladenov / Casualties</p> | <p>Nickolay Mladenov confirmed as Director-General of the Board of Peace, overseeing Gaza governance. Published 15-point roadmap covering Hamas disarmament and IDF withdrawal. Hamas disarmament not required immediately under proposed plan. (Times of Israel; Reuters.)</p> <p>Gaza casualties as of May 6, 2026: 72,619 Palestinians killed, 172,484 injured (Ministry of Health via OCHA). Peer-reviewed studies document significant undercount; adjusted total exceeds 75,000 dead. Israeli airstrikes, artillery, naval shelling, and drone attacks continued throughout ceasefire period — at least 111 Palestinians including 18 children killed in April alone. (OCHA; peer-reviewed study cited by Reuters.)</p> <p>The Board of Peace presides over a territory where killing continued after the ceasefire was declared. Its director-general published a roadmap. Its reconstruction mandate is being built into the Iran MOU. No humanitarian motive: confirmed by the institution’s own governance record.</p> |
| <p>Russia / Sanctions / Harvest</p> | <p>OFAC GL 134B expired May 16 without renewal. Formal prohibition restored. Shadow fleet context: 68% of Russian crude already moving on sanctioned vessels; 111 designated vessels continued loading regardless. Russian revenues at two-year highs. Anomaly refined: mechanism wrong, structural outcome confirmed. (Kyiv Independent, Fortune, May 16; GSSC March 2026.)</p> <p>MOU reported terms include U.S. sanctions relief on Iran — which would reduce global oil disruption and structurally compress the premium that has been generating Russian windfall revenues. The architecture’s Russian financial harvest is time-limited by the same settlement it was designed to produce. This is the architecture’s most sophisticated temporal design: the war generates the harvest; the settlement captures the institutional mandate; both serve the architecture’s principal in sequence.</p> |
| <p>\$800M Oil Futures / Insider Trading</p> | <p>Reuters reported U.S. authorities probing \$800 million in oil futures trades executed before Trump’s announcement of a strike delay — up from the \$580 million figure reported in Issues Two and Three. The figure has grown with additional reporting. No formal SEC enforcement action announced. Chapter Fifteen Forensic Target One developing in real time. (Reuters.)</p> |
| <p>Reconciliation / \$10B Misdirection</p> | <p>The \$1 billion for Trump’s Mar-a-Lago ballroom and \$1.8 billion “Weaponization” slush fund consumed media because Senate Republicans lacked votes for reconciliation inclusion. Senate left Washington for Memorial Day without a vote. The \$10 billion Board of Peace commitment — a number five to ten times larger, involving a post-presidential institution with no historical precedent — received a fraction of the coverage. The architecture’s misdirection principle operating at the media-environment level: the small, legible corruptions draw the camera while the large structural one proceeds undisturbed.</p> |

THE ARCHITECTURE'S LENS

The Lens applies the book's analytical framework to the week's developments as a running test of its predictive validity. This issue's Lens addresses two analytical contributions: Section One names the network the architecture has been building. Section Two identifies the Delcy model as its membership recruitment mechanism across four simultaneous theaters.

SECTION ONE — THE NETWORK NAMED

The week's most significant development is not any single event. It is the relationship that became visible between two events on the same day: Trump's May 25 Truth Social post demanding that all named countries "mandatorily" sign the Abraham Accords, and the documented fact that every country he named — Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Turkiye, UAE, Bahrain — is already a founding member of the Board of Peace.

This is not a coincidence. It is the architecture's finish line, stated publicly by its principal in plain language for the first time.

"I am mandatorily requesting that all Countries immediately sign the Abraham Accords, and that, if Iran signs its Agreement with me, as President of the United States of America, it would be an Honor to have them also be part of this unparalleled World Coalition. The Middle East would be United, Powerful, and Economically Strong, like perhaps no other area, anywhere in the World!" — Donald Trump, Truth Social, May 25, 2026

Read that statement through the architecture's analytical framework and it describes something no previous American president has publicly pursued: the construction of a parallel international order — built around American executive power, Gulf sovereign wealth, Israeli security relationships, and selected non-Western partners — designed to manage the post-conflict Middle East outside the institutions that would otherwise govern it.

The Abraham Accords provide the diplomatic membership list. The Board of Peace provides the institutional governance framework. The Iran war provides the founding justification. And the chairman whose authority is permanent, whose successor he selects, and whose financial interests are served by the network's expansion is the same man who announced the war, managed its stalling cycles, and is now demanding that the countries whose compliance the war produced sign both frameworks simultaneously.

The two frameworks are not parallel initiatives. They are the same initiative described in two vocabularies — one diplomatic, one institutional. The Accords provide the normalization framework that makes Board membership politically viable for Arab and Muslim-majority states. The Board provides the institutional architecture that makes Accords participation financially rewarding. Together they describe not a Middle East peace process but a Middle East order.

THE APPLEBAUM QUESTIONS

Anne Applebaum's Autocracy, Inc. asks four questions of any network whose stated purpose is peace or stability. Applied here:

Who gains influence within this structure? Every Abraham Accords state that joins the Board of Peace becomes structurally dependent on the chairman's goodwill for reconstruction financing, security architecture

participation, and diplomatic positioning in the post-war regional order. The influence flows from the chairman outward. The network is not horizontal. It is radial — every spoke connects to the same hub.

Which leaders are being brought into a common political forum? The overlap is documented and complete. UAE, Bahrain, Morocco: original Abraham Accords participants and Board of Peace founding members. Egypt, Jordan: long-standing Israel peace partners, Board founding members. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan: countries Trump demanded join the Accords this morning, already inside the Board's institutional framework. The sequencing is the architecture's tell: you do not need to sign the Abraham Accords before joining the Board of Peace. But once inside the Board's financial and governance architecture, the political cost of Accords participation drops dramatically — because you are already coordinating with Israel in the same institutional forum. The Board normalizes the normalization.

What institutions are being bypassed? The United Nations provided Resolution 2803 — but the Board operates outside UN governance. The World Bank provides multilateral reconstruction frameworks — but the Board's JPMorgan Chase account operates outside those frameworks. NATO manages Gulf security relationships — but the Board's regional security coordination operates outside NATO's treaty structure. The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu, a Board participant whose continued presence normalizes his forum participation despite the warrant. Major Western democracies — France, Germany, UK, Canada — declined Board membership, recognizing exactly what they were being asked to join.

Does the arrangement strengthen rules-based institutions or concentrate decision-making among a smaller group of leaders? The Board's charter answers this in its governance provisions: a lifetime chairman with no electoral accountability, no congressional check, no term limit, and successor selection authority. This is not an unintended consequence. It is the explicit structural design of the institution.

This is Autocracy, Inc. with an American architect. The network includes autocracies and democracies alike — because the architecture does not require its members to share a governing philosophy. It requires only that they share enough financial interest in the Board's reconstruction mandate, enough security dependency on American protection, and enough political investment in the normalization framework to make departure from the network more costly than participation in it.

THE LOCK-IN MECHANISM

Every country that joins the Board of Peace, every country that signs the Abraham Accords, every country that accepts managed sovereignty in exchange for reconstruction capital — becomes harder to exit the network with each passing month. The contracts get signed. The institutional relationships deepen. The political cost of breaking with the chairman rises.

The lock-in is not coercive in the conventional sense. No country is being forced to join. Each is being offered something it genuinely wants: reconstruction capital for post-war rebuilding, security guarantees against regional adversaries, diplomatic legitimacy through association with American power, and economic access to Gulf sovereign wealth networks. The offer is real. The conditions attached to it — managed sovereignty, investor priority, Accords normalization, Board governance compliance — are the price. And the price is paid not in a single transaction but incrementally, over months and years, as the network's financial architecture deepens the dependency that makes the conditions non-negotiable.

This is the architecture's most durable feature: it does not require the chairman to remain president. It requires only that the institutional relationships, financial dependencies, and governance structures built during the presidency survive it — which the Board's charter was specifically designed to ensure.

SECTION TWO — THE MEMBERSHIP MECHANISM: THE DELCY MODEL AT SCALE

If Section One names the network, Section Two identifies the tool through which individual countries are moved from adversary or neutral status into network participation. The architecture this week deployed that tool in four theaters simultaneously.

The Delcy model — named in the book's Chapter Four for Venezuela's Vice President, installed as acting president after Maduro's removal — describes a specific governance mechanism: not regime change but regime decapitation followed by installation of a pre-negotiated insider who accepts managed sovereignty in exchange for protection of position and access to capital. The insider knows the machinery, controls the levers, and has privately agreed to honor the conditions before the operation that installs them is announced.

The book predicted this model would be deployed in Iran. The NYT this week confirmed the deployment attempt — and its failure.

IRAN — THE MODEL'S MOST EXPLICIT DOCUMENTED DEPLOYMENT: The Ahmadinejad operation confirms all four Delcy model conditions. Condition One — corrupt or corruptible insider: Ahmadinejad was barred from elections, his aides arrested, himself restricted to house arrest. Marginalized by the regime he was being asked to replace. Condition Two — institutional knowledge the regime cannot afford disclosed: co-author of Ahmadinejad biography Meir Javedanfar: "He knows a hell of a lot about it." Condition Three — pre-negotiated compliance signals: Ahmadinejad publicly praised Trump as a "man of action" who understands "cost-benefits." Condition Four — no democratic legitimacy required: Trump said publicly in February 2026 that regime change was "the best thing that could happen" and there are "people" he wants to take over. The operation failed for operational reasons. The model was the intended mechanism. The architecture is now managing the failure.

CUBA — THE MODEL IN REAL-TIME NEGOTIATION: Raulito meets all four conditions. The Raúl Castro indictment is the legal leverage that makes Raulito's cooperation available — he can negotiate his grandfather's legal exposure as part of the arrangement. His security chief role provides the institutional knowledge condition. Díaz-Canel confirming negotiations while Raulito sits beside him is the compliance signal. The former NSC official's assessment that any deal Raulito negotiates will include the regime's survival is the Delcy model stated by an analyst with no interest in confirming it.

GREENLAND — THE MODEL'S MOST SOPHISTICATED VARIANT: Greenland's "regime" is not a corrupt government but a sovereign territory whose capital dependency creates the same structural leverage. The forever clause is the managed sovereignty condition. The investment veto is the investor priority condition. The military security framework is the protection-of-position offer. The Monitor's revised prediction stands: announcement before July 4; binding agreement requiring Greenlandic parliamentary ratification is not predicted. The investor positioning — Critical Metals Corp's Tanbreez stake — advances regardless.

VENEZUELA — THE ORIGINAL: Delcy Rodríguez signed a sweeping hydrocarbons law reform within 26 days of installation. Venezuelan oil is in different channels. The conditions are operative. There is no election timeline. The model's original deployment continues to function exactly as designed.

Four theaters. Four deployments of the same model. Two confirmed, one developing, one operationally failed but architecturally intact. The Delcy model is not a Venezuela-specific

tactic. It is the architecture's standard membership recruitment mechanism — the tool through which each new territory is converted from adversary or neutral into network participant, on the chairman's terms, without requiring a democratic process to legitimize the conversion.

THE ABRAHAM ACCORDS AS THE ARCHITECTURE'S CONTINGENCY

Trump's May 25 Truth Social post arrived on the same morning that Iran MOU optimism was waning. This timing is not coincidental. It is the architecture's contingency plan for a settlement that underdelivers.

If the Iran MOU cannot be announced as a comprehensive victory before July 4, the Abraham Accords expansion can be. Saudi Arabia joining the Accords, or Qatar normalizing, is a historic diplomatic achievement Trump can present as the Iran war's positive legacy regardless of whether the Hormuz governance language is resolved. It is the narrative victory the architecture requires when the operational victory is delayed.

More importantly: every country that joins the Abraham Accords in the coming weeks is simultaneously deepening its participation in the Board of Peace's institutional framework. The two announcements are functionally the same announcement described in two different vocabularies. The countries, the financial relationships, and the structural dependency are identical in both. Trump does not need a comprehensive Iran MOU. He needs a regional architecture announcement large enough to present as a new Middle East order. The Abraham Accords expansion plus the Board's institutionalization plus partial Hormuz resolution plus Putin's rehabilitation as mediator equals a July 4 announcement that reads as historic regardless of what the fine print contains.

The architecture's finish line is not the Iran deal. The Iran deal is one component of the finish line. The finish line is the network — declared, institutionalized, and presented to the world as the Middle East's new order before July 4, 2026, 38 days from the date of this publication.

ISSUE FIVE PREDICTIONS

| Five predictions below, each dated, specific, and falsifiable. Evaluated in Issue Six.

1 Before July 4, Trump will announce a regional architecture — Abraham Accords expansion plus Iran MOU plus Board of Peace mandate — as a unified historic achievement, regardless of whether the Hormuz governance terms are fully resolved.

Trump's May 25 Truth Social post named the architecture's finish line explicitly. The America 250 forcing clock is 38 days away. The contingency described above — Accords expansion as narrative victory when MOU underdelivers — is operationally available and consistent with the architecture's documented pattern of announcement-before-agreement. The announcement will describe a new Middle East order. The fine print will contain the architecture's actual terms.

2 The Iran MOU's Hormuz governance provisions will include a face-saving formulation for the toll system — labeled as a coordination fee, security surcharge, or maritime management arrangement — whose substance is Iranian sovereignty over Hormuz traffic regardless of its label.

Iran state media has confirmed Hormuz will "not return to its pre-war status." The toll system is Iran's institutionalized sovereignty claim. Trump has rejected "tolls" publicly. The gap between those two positions resolves through language, not substance. Watch what the Hormuz governance provisions say. The announcement and the agreement are different documents.

3 A named alternative to Ahmadinejad as Iran's post-war governance figure will emerge in reporting within 30 days.

The Ahmadinejad operation's failure leaves the MOU's governance provisions without a named insider candidate. The architecture requires a compliance mechanism. The 30-day negotiation period the MOU creates is the window within which a replacement Delcy model candidate will either be named publicly or appear in reporting from sources familiar with the talks.

4 Trump will publicly credit Putin for a constructive role in the Iran-Ukraine simultaneous resolution announcement before July 4.

The similar timetable statement on May 25 linked both wars to the same endpoint. The architecture's Putin rehabilitation Stage Three — credited statesman at the moment of resolution — requires the announcement to name him explicitly. Trump has already said he trusts Putin more than any European ally. The rehabilitation narrative is structurally required for the Board of Peace's eventual Russian membership to follow.

5 The Greenland investment veto will be announced as a "historic security partnership" before July 4, with the forever clause embedded in the framework document. No binding sovereignty agreement ratified by Greenland's parliament will exist at the time of announcement.

Greenlandic officials' documented anxiety about the July 4 deadline is the architecture's forcing clock operating from the recipient's perspective. Trump needs the announcement. Greenland needs to avoid military confrontation. The EU competing offer narrows Greenland's alternatives but does not eliminate the pressure. The announcement and the binding agreement will not be the same document.

EDITORIAL NOTE — ON THE NETWORK AND WHAT IT MEANS

Issue Five's analytical contribution to the Monitor's running framework is the naming of the network. Previous issues documented the architecture's components: the Board of Peace, the back channel, the stalling mechanism, the misdirection pairs, the Delcy model, the delay-as-strategy principle. This issue names what those components have been building: a parallel international order whose membership list is the Abraham Accords, whose institutional framework is the Board of Peace, whose founding justification is the Iran war, and whose chairman is permanent.

The network's most important feature is the one Anne Applebaum identified in *Autocracy, Inc.*: it does not require its members to share a governing philosophy. It requires only shared financial interest, shared security dependency, and shared political investment in the normalization framework that makes departure more costly than participation. Autocracies and democracies sit at the same table. The chairman is indifferent to the distinction. He is interested in the dependency.

This Monitor adds one item to its analytical glossary: the Abraham Accords as diplomatic superstructure. Every previous glossary entry described a method — delay is the strategy, military requirement as investment cover, actions not words. The Abraham Accords entry describes a vehicle: the normalization framework that converts Board of Peace institutional membership into international diplomatic legitimacy, and converts the chairman from a post-presidential empire builder into a peacemaker whose network spans the Middle East, Central Asia, and increasingly the world.

The architecture was always pointing here. Thirty-eight days remain before the America 250 clock requires the announcement. The Monitor will be watching what is announced. And watching, separately, what is signed.

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