

Iran War Weekly Intelligence Briefing

Operation Epic Benefit — Weekly Supplement

ISSUE	PERIOD	PUBLISHED	AUTHOR
EIGHT	June 8 — June 14, 2026	June 16, 2026	H.H. Thorpe

ISSUE SEVEN PREDICTIONS: REVIEWED

Five predictions made in Issue Seven. Each evaluated below.

1	CONFIRMED	<p>Before July 4, Trump will announce an Iran framework as a historic achievement regardless of whether the four major sticking points are fully resolved — framed as a new Middle East order.</p> <p>June 14: Trump, Vance, and Iranian Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf digitally signed a 14-point MOU 20 days before the July 4 deadline. Trump immediately declared it a triumph of deal-making and historic diplomatic achievement. The announcement layer delivered precisely as predicted. The four major sticking points — enrichment, Hormuz governance, frozen assets, war reparations — remain unresolved and deferred to the 60-day negotiation window. [Confirmed — framework announced June 14, on schedule]</p>
2	CONFIRMED	<p>The MOU’s Hormuz governance provisions will avoid the word “toll” while including a face-saving arrangement that preserves Iranian economic benefit from maritime traffic.</p> <p>Confirmed in contradictory public statements the same day the MOU was announced. Trump declared the Strait “toll-free.” Iran’s Foreign Minister Araghchi immediately stated Iran retains administrative control and intends to collect transit fees. Neither used the word “toll” in their framing. Both sides are describing the same provision in incompatible terms — the face-saving language predicted. [Confirmed]</p>
3	CONFIRMED	<p>Venezuelan elections will not be scheduled before the midterms, and the U.S. will not publicly demand them.</p> <p>Through June 14, Washington has not responded to González’s election demands. Neither Caracas nor Washington has indicated elections are imminent. Rubio’s “phases of stabilization” framing remains operative. The Nobel laureate’s demand received rhetorical coverage and operational silence from Washington. [Confirmed — pattern holds through issue period]</p>
4	CONFIRMED	<p>Cuba’s negotiations will produce a prisoner release or humanitarian gesture framed as progress before July 4, without any commitment to leadership transition or democratic elections.</p> <p>Cuba released 51 prisoners in Vatican-mediated talks, confirmed in the June 1-7 coverage window and carrying through to June 14. No leadership transition requirement attached. No democratic election commitment made. The humanitarian gesture-as-progress instrument deployed exactly as predicted. [Confirmed]</p>
5	CONFIRMED	<p>The MOU’s governance provisions will be silent on post-war democratic elections in Iran, completing the democracy asymmetry across all four</p>

theaters.

The 14-point MOU as described by U.S. and Iranian officials contains no reference to post-war governance elections in Iran. The text has not been publicly released, but neither side has referenced democratic transition requirements. The architecture's fourth simultaneous democracy bypass is complete. [Confirmed]

CUMULATIVE SCORECARD — THROUGH ISSUE EIGHT

CONFIRMED PREDICTIONS (TOTAL)	34 — Issue Eight adds 5 new confirmations (all five Issue Seven predictions)
ANOMALIES REFINED (MECHANISM WRONG, OUTCOME CONFIRMED)	1 — OFAC GL 134B expiration
TOTAL RESOLVED ENTRIES	35
ACCURACY RATE (CONFIRMED ÷ TOTAL RESOLVED)	97%
ISSUES PUBLISHED	Eight

THE WEEK'S DEVELOPMENTS

Iran MOU — June 14	<p>June 14: The 14-point Memorandum of Understanding was digitally signed by Trump, Vance, and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf following 15-hour intensive sessions mediated by Qatar and Pakistan. An in-person signing ceremony is scheduled for Geneva, June 19, with Vance and potentially Trump attending alongside Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Araghchi. The MOU text has not been publicly released. (Times of Israel, The Hill, CNBC, June 14-15.)</p> <p>Immediate provisions per official statements: permanent cessation of military operations on all fronts including Lebanon; Strait of Hormuz “opened” to international shipping; U.S. naval blockade to be lifted within 30 days; temporary sanctions eased to allow Iranian oil sales; \$24 billion in frozen Iranian assets to be facilitated for release. (The Guardian, The Hindu, Wikipedia summary of Mehr News draft, June 14.)</p> <p>What the MOU does NOT contain: any concrete nuclear restrictions; any commitment on enrichment limits, centrifuge counts, or uranium disposal; any resolution of the Hormuz toll/sovereignty dispute; any commitment on war reparations; any post-war governance framework for Iran. All of these are deferred to a 60-day negotiation window. The text the public has not seen contains the architecture’s most important provisions. (The Guardian, CNN, June 15.)</p> <p>The document’s length, per Vance on CNN: approximately one and a half pages. (CNN, June 15.)</p>
The 14-Point Plan — Leaked Text and Its Limits	<p>Iranian state-affiliated outlet Mehr News Agency published what it describes as the full draft text of the 14-point MOU. The BBC confirmed the document is approximately two pages. Fortune and CBS News also published summaries of the leaked draft. The Trump administration has not publicly confirmed the leaked text is accurate. Trump posted on Truth Social that Iranian leaks were “Fake News” that “bear no relation to the truth,” specifically pushing back on the optics of immediate financial concessions. The Monitor treats the leaked text as unverified but analytically significant. (Mehr News; BBC; Fortune; CBS News, June 14-15.)</p> <p>What the leaked 14 points reportedly contain: immediate military cessation on all fronts including Lebanon; mutual sovereignty pledge; 60-day negotiation clock; U.S. lifts naval blockade within 30 days; Iran clears Hormuz mines within 30 days; \$300 billion reconstruction program outlined by U.S. and regional partners; agreement to eventually dissolve all U.S. unilateral sanctions, UN resolutions, and IAEA restrictions in a final pact; Iran reaffirms it will never build nuclear weapons (a longstanding Iranian public position, not a new concession); enrichment levels frozen at current levels for 60 days; immediate U.S. oil export waivers for Iran; gradual release of \$24 billion in frozen assets linked to negotiation milestones; joint compliance monitoring body; prerequisite sequencing (final negotiations begin only once blockade, Hormuz, oil waivers, and asset release are actively implemented); UN Security Council endorsement required for final treaty.</p> <p>The structural character of the document is analytically important: the leaked draft is a ceasefire and negotiation roadmap, not a completed nuclear agreement. The Trump administration’s framing — that brevity is a feature, an executive-style term sheet designed to clear the battlefield before heavy drafting begins — is structurally accurate as a description of the document’s purpose. The right JCPOA comparison is not MOU versus JCPOA. It is final 60-day agreement versus JCPOA. That comparison does not yet exist. The Monitor will apply it when it does. (BBC; Fortune, June 15.)</p>
The Contradictions	<p>Toll contradiction: Trump declared the Strait “toll-free” and with “unhindered access.” Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi immediately stated that while shipping would move freely, Iran retains administrative control and intends to collect transit fees. Both statements were issued the same day. The MOU text — unreleased — contains language both sides are interpreting in incompatible ways. (The Hindu; Guardian, June 14.)</p> <p>Nuclear contradiction: Trump stated on Truth Social that Iran “no longer wants a nuclear weapon.” The MOU draft contains zero concrete nuclear concessions per The Guardian’s</p>

	<p>reporting. Senior U.S. officials acknowledged the U.S. will know “over the next two or three weeks” whether a follow-on nuclear agreement can actually be reached. Iranian hardliner Paydari Front held street rallies accusing the government of capitulating to the “Great Satan.” Tehran is telling its hardline factions it has not conceded a single centrifuge. (Times of Israel; Guardian; PBS, June 14-15.)</p> <p>War reparations: Iranian spokespeople declared war reparations “essential” to a final deal. The Trump administration has not publicly conceded this point. The \$24 billion frozen assets release may be framed as partial reparations by Iran and as an unrelated financial mechanism by Washington. The same provision — described differently — by both parties. (Document One provided.)</p>
<p>Israel — The Deal’s Most Dangerous Fault Line</p>	<p>Trump to Financial Times on June 7, when Netanyahu resisted: “Netanyahu won’t have any choice. I call the shots. I call all the shots. He doesn’t call the shots.” This statement — made while Iran was firing ballistic missiles at northern Israel — is the most explicit public subordination of Israeli operational autonomy to American deal-making in the U.S.-Israel relationship’s modern history. (Times of Israel, June 7.)</p> <p>Israeli reaction to the MOU announcement: furious, across party lines. National Security Minister Ben Gvir: “Trump’s agreement does not bind us.” Defense Minister Katz vowed to retain troops in Lebanon. Former PM Bennett: “Netanyahu can no longer fix it, we will do it.” Yair Lapid: “Iran emerged stronger; Israel emerged weaker. That is Netanyahu’s strategic responsibility. He failed.” Opposition leader Liberman: a “diplomatic disaster much worse than Obama’s agreement” with Iran. (PBS; Times of Israel; The Hill, June 15.)</p> <p>Israel finds itself in a structural quagmire: it invaded southern Lebanon during the war and must now withdraw or remain in violation of ceasefire terms Iran demanded as a condition of any deal. Netanyahu faces elections this fall having staked his political future on his Trump relationship — which has now produced a deal much of Israel views as a strategic defeat. Bloomberg: “That’s become a liability now that the US president has cut a deal with Iran that much of Israel opposes.” (Bloomberg, June 15.)</p>
<p>G7 — Evian-les-Bains, June 15-17</p>	<p>Trump arrived in France for the G7 summit immediately following the MOU announcement. The deal’s announcement was timed to arrive before the summit — giving Trump a diplomatic achievement to present to the G7 allies he has spent two years sidelining. NATO allies welcomed the energy price relief but remained anxious about the deal’s durability and Trump’s unilateral style. The G7 was given the deal as a <i>fait accompli</i>, not as a coordinated outcome. (Radio Free Europe.)</p> <p>Trump is expected to travel from the G7 directly to Geneva for the June 19 formal signing ceremony — positioning the week as the architecture’s most triumphant public performance: war ended, deal signed, G7 addressed, America 250 celebration 15 days away.</p>
<p>Economic Costs — The War’s Bill</p>	<p>The documented economic toll of the three-month war, per independent institutions: Brent crude peaked at \$126.70 per barrel (a 72% rise from \$72 pre-war); WTI surged past \$100. IEA estimated a 12-million-barrel-per-day global oil supply reduction — exceeding the 1973 and 1979 crises combined. U.S. PCE inflation rose from 2.9% in February to 3.8% in April. (Document Two; IEA.)</p> <p>Agricultural consequences: one-third of global nitrogen fertilizer exports transit Hormuz. Urea prices spiked from \$482 to over \$700 per ton. U.S. corn industry alone estimated at \$10 billion GDP loss. Midwest farmers bought nitrogen at \$900-\$1,100 per ton for the spring planting season — costs locked in regardless of when prices normalize. Consumer food prices elevated through 2027 even under optimistic scenarios. (Document Two.)</p> <p>Recovery timeline per Barclays and IHS Markit: global GDP growth depressed to 2.3% for the remainder of 2026 and into 2027. Return to true pre-war norms for regular consumers not expected until mid-to-late 2027. Oil-producing states recover fast; energy-importing manufacturing zones (Germany, Eurozone) face protracted recovery. The asymmetric recovery benefits precisely the actors the architecture was designed to benefit. (Document Two.)</p>

THE ARCHITECTURE'S LENS

Issue Eight's Lens addresses the MOU's announcement as the architecture's most significant single event — and applies the Monitor's evidentiary standard to what the announcement reveals, what it conceals, and what the 60-day window will require. The JCPOA comparison table, the page-length analysis, and the cost accounting together constitute the Monitor's most analytically consequential single-issue contribution.

SECTION ONE — ONE AND A HALF PAGES

The most analytically significant single fact of the week is not the MOU's announcement. It is its length — and what that length reveals about the document's actual function. Vice President Vance told CNN's Jake Tapper on June 15 that the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran is “about a page and a half.” The BBC independently confirmed the document is approximately two pages. Iranian state-affiliated outlet Mehr News Agency published what it describes as the full leaked draft text. Trump posted on Truth Social that Iranian leaks were “Fake News” bearing “no relation to the truth.” The Monitor treats the leaked text as unverified but analytically significant, noting that the administration's pushback focused on the optics of financial concessions rather than the structural character of the document.

The Trump administration's own framing of the document's brevity is instructive: Vance and Trump describe the MOU as an executive-style term sheet designed to clear the battlefield before heavy drafting begins. This is structurally accurate. The 14-point plan is a ceasefire and negotiation roadmap — a bridge document, not a completed nuclear agreement. Its brevity is, in the administration's framing, intentional: establish a position of strength, halt the shooting, then draft the substance.

The analytical question the Monitor must ask is therefore not ‘is a page and a half enough pages for a deal’ — which misunderstands the document type. It is: what was paid to reach this bridge document, and what does the bridge need to produce in 60 days for the cost to have been worth it? Obama's JCPOA — 159 pages of verified, monitored, specific nuclear commitments — was achieved without a war, without a global energy crisis, without American casualties, and without \$900-per-ton fertilizer devastating the American corn belt. The MOU's bridge to a comparable outcome was purchased at the cost documented in Section Four of this Lens. That cost is not deferred to the 60-day window. It was paid in full to reach the bridge.

The JCPOA was a destination. The MOU is a bridge to the possibility of a destination. The bridge cost more to build than the destination cost Obama to reach. Whether the bridge leads somewhere comparable to where Obama arrived is the Monitor's central analytical question for Issues Nine and Ten.

THE JCPOA COMPARISON — WHAT CAN AND CANNOT BE COMPARED NOW

	JCPOA (OBAMA, 2015)	MOU (TRUMP, JUNE 14, 2026)
Document type	Completed nuclear accord ready for immediate implementation	Bridge document: ceasefire and negotiation roadmap opening a 60-day window. Not yet a nuclear agreement. Comparison to JCPOA terms is premature until the 60-day final agreement exists.

	JCPOA (OBAMA, 2015)	MOU (TRUMP, JUNE 14, 2026)
Document length	159 pages (109 main agreement + 50 pages of five technical annexes)	Approximately 1.5–2 pages (per Vance on CNN; per BBC; confirmed by leaked Mehr News draft)
Negotiating parties	P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China, Germany) plus EU — 20 months of multilateral diplomacy	U.S. and Iran, via Qatari and Pakistani intermediaries — 15 hours of intensive sessions
Nuclear specificity	Extremely dense: exact centrifuge serial numbers, piping layouts, down-blending steps, continuous IAEA monitoring	Vague by design: Iran reaffirms it will never build nuclear weapons (longstanding public position). Enrichment specifics deferred to 60-day talks. Per BBC: “Simply states the future of enrichment will be resolved during the 60-day talks.”
Commercial layer	Sanctions relief linked to nuclear compliance verification only	\$300 billion reconstruction fund confirmed in leaked draft; \$24 billion in frozen assets released; naval blockade lifted within 30 days; oil export waivers immediate. Commercial concessions precede nuclear resolution in prerequisite sequencing.
Hormuz	Not addressed (predates the closure)	Iran clears mines within 30 days. Toll/sovereignty question contradicted by both parties within hours of signing. Not resolved in MOU.
Cost to achieve THIS document	No military action; no disruption to global energy markets; no American casualties; no civilian deaths from the negotiation	3-month war; 72% oil price spike; IEA worst energy crisis in history; U.S. military expenditures; American and Iranian casualties; 75,000+ dead in Gaza; Ras Laffan damaged for years. These costs were paid for a bridge document, not a final agreement.
Trump’s assessment of JCPOA	“A horrible deal”; “a catastrophe”; “an easy, beautiful, smooth road to a nuclear weapon”	Trump: “My Agreement with Iran is the exact opposite, A WALL TO NO NUCLEAR WEAPON!” The JCPOA comparison becomes analytically valid when the 60-day final agreement is produced. The Monitor will apply it then.

A precise analytical caveat is required before reading this table. The Monitor identified the JCPOA trap in Issues Six and Seven as the architecture’s defining constraint: Trump cannot sign a deal comparable to or weaker than the JCPOA without creating an accountability problem his critics can exploit with arithmetic. That trap remains real. But the leaked 14-point text clarifies the comparison’s proper timing.

The MOU is a bridge document — a ceasefire and negotiation roadmap designed to halt a hot war and open a 60-day window. The Trump administration’s description of it as an executive-style term sheet before heavy drafting begins is structurally accurate. A page-and-a-half term sheet is not the right thing to compare to a 159-page verified nuclear agreement with five technical annexes. They are not the same type of document. Comparing them directly overstates the case — and the Monitor’s credibility depends on not overstating cases.

The right comparison is JCPOA versus the final 60-day agreement — the document that will emerge (or fail to emerge) from the negotiation window. That comparison does not yet exist. When it does, the Monitor will apply it with the same evidentiary standard it has applied to every other analytical claim across eight issues.

The table below documents what can be compared now: the cost of the two approaches, the document types, and the structural character of each.

What the cost column documents is the Monitor's most important current analytical observation and cannot be deferred to the 60-day window. The JCPOA's cost was diplomatic effort and political capital. The MOU's cost — paid in full before any nuclear agreement exists — includes a 72% oil price spike, the IEA's worst energy crisis in history designation, American military expenditures in the hundreds of billions, American and Iranian casualties, 75,000 dead in Gaza under related operations, Ras Laffan damaged for years, food prices elevated through 2027, and a global GDP growth rate depressed to 2.3% for eighteen months. That cost was paid to achieve a 1.5-page framework for a conversation. Whether the conversation produces something comparable to the JCPOA — or better, or worse — the cost has already been incurred.

The architecture predicted the Russian financial harvest and the Board of Peace mandate expansion. Both confirmed. The \$300 billion reconstruction fund is in the leaked draft text. The cost's asymmetry — oil-producing states recovering fast, energy-importing manufacturing zones recovering slowly — benefits precisely the architecture's principals and falls on everyone else. That asymmetry is not deferred to the 60-day window. It is already operative.

SECTION TWO — WHAT THE MOU IS AND IS NOT

The Monitor has applied one analytical discipline consistently across eight issues: the announcement and the agreement are different documents. That discipline is now the most important lens for reading the MOU.

WHAT THE MOU IS

A ceasefire extension formalized in writing. A commitment to begin 60 days of negotiations on the substantive issues — nuclear, Hormuz, sanctions, assets, reparations — that remain unresolved. A political achievement that allows both Trump and Iranian leadership to claim victory domestically before their respective internal deadlines. A framework that, if the 60-day window produces nothing, leaves the status quo intact and the war potentially resumable. A page and a half.

WHAT THE MOU IS NOT

A nuclear agreement. A Hormuz governance resolution. A commitment that Iran has abandoned nuclear enrichment. A toll-free Strait in any sense that Iran has agreed to. A better deal than the JCPOA — it is not yet a deal at all. A document whose full text has been made public. A framework that resolves any of the four major sticking points the Monitor has been tracking since Issue Five.

The 60-day window is the MOU's most important analytical feature — and the architecture's most significant remaining risk. Two things must be true simultaneously for the 60-day window to produce the commercial outcome the architecture requires: Iran must accept enrichment restrictions sufficient for Trump to claim victory over Obama's framework, and Iran must accept the investment access conditions attached to the \$300 billion fund. Both require Iran to concede something it has publicly said it will not concede. The enrichment red line is explicit. The sovereignty over reconstruction terms is implicit but structurally identical.

The architecture's JCPOA trap, which the Monitor first named in Issue Six, is now the deal's defining structural constraint. Trump cannot sign a 60-day nuclear agreement whose terms are comparable to the JCPOA he destroyed without creating a political accountability problem his domestic critics will exploit with the precision the comparison table above illustrates. And he cannot sign an agreement less favorable than the

JCPOA without Iran having achieved, through three months of war, a better outcome than it had in 2015 without firing a shot.

The 60-day window is not a negotiation between equals who both want a deal. It is a negotiation between a party that needs a specific kind of deal for domestic political reasons and a party that has already received most of the immediate concessions — the blockade lifted, the assets released, the oil sales permitted — and whose remaining leverage is the enrichment question that the MOU deferred rather than resolved.

SECTION THREE — ISRAEL AND THE ARCHITECTURE'S MOST EXPOSED FAULT LINE

Trump's statement to the Financial Times on June 7 — "Netanyahu won't have any choice. I call the shots. I call all the shots. He doesn't call the shots" — was made while Iranian ballistic missiles were landing in northern Israel. It is the most explicit public subordination of Israeli operational autonomy to American deal-making in the modern U.S.-Israel relationship.

Israel's reaction to the MOU confirms the architecture's most significant unmanaged variable. The architecture needed Israel's military operations to produce the conditions that made the settlement necessary. It did not need Israel's political reaction to the settlement to threaten the settlement's durability. Ben Gvir declaring the deal does not bind Israel, Katz vowing to retain Lebanon troops, and Netanyahu finding himself described across Israeli political lines as having led the country to a diplomatic disaster — these are not manageable through Trump's personal calls. They are structural: Israel is now in a ceasefire whose terms Iran demanded as a condition of the deal, which Israel was not party to and did not agree to.

If Israel strikes an Iranian target before the Geneva signing on June 19 — in Lebanon, in Iran itself, or against Iranian-backed forces anywhere in the region — the MOU collapses before the ceremony. That risk is not theoretical. Ben Gvir has said the deal does not bind Israel. The IDF Chief of Staff said the IDF will strike the moment the green light is given. The green light question is now the single most consequential variable between the Monitor's publication date and the Geneva ceremony on June 19.

SECTION FOUR — THE ARCHITECTURE'S ACCOUNTING

The Monitor has tracked the architecture's predicted outcomes across eight issues. Issue Eight is the moment to apply the evidentiary standard to what the architecture has produced, what it has cost, and who bears each side of the ledger.

The architecture produced its financial objectives. The bill was sent to everyone else.

What the architecture's principals gained, documented: Russian fossil fuel revenues rescued from a post-sanction low to two-year highs. Board of Peace mandate expanded from Gaza to Iran's reconstruction framework. \$300 billion investment fund with Witkoff and Kushner as named originators. Venezuelan oil sector access operative. Gulf sovereign wealth relationships deepened. Abraham Accords expansion demanded as simultaneous announcement. Greenland investor positioning advancing. The architecture's principals are in better financial and institutional position on June 14, 2026, than they were on February 28, 2026.

What the architecture cost, documented: American consumers absorbed a 3.8% PCE inflation rate driven by energy. American farmers paid \$900-\$1,100 per ton for nitrogen fertilizer during planting season. American servicemembers died in the theater. The U.S. defense budget expanded to cover sustained carrier strike group deployments and hundreds of precision-guided missile strikes. Arrow and Iron Dome interceptor stockpiles were exhausted, requiring emergency resupply legislation. America's NATO allies absorbed massive energy spikes without warning or consultation. 75,000 Palestinians died under related operations. The global economy will not return to pre-war consumer norms until mid-to-late 2027.

The asymmetry between who gained and who paid is the architecture's most damning documented feature — and the Monitor's eight-issue evidentiary record is now sufficient to state it plainly. The architecture was not designed to serve American national interests, American consumers, American allies, or American values. It was designed to serve a specific network of interlocking financial and geopolitical interests whose principals are documented in the book this Monitor supplements. The MOU's announcement is the architecture's most visible public moment. The one-and-a-half-page document whose text has not been released is the architecture's most important current unexamined instrument. The 60-day window is the architecture's most consequential remaining operational phase.

ISSUE EIGHT PREDICTIONS

Five predictions below. The MOU's announcement is confirmed. The 60-day negotiation window is the Monitor's primary tracking subject for Issues Nine and Ten. Predictions are framed around what the 60-day window will produce — and what it will not.

1 The Geneva signing ceremony will occur on June 19 as scheduled, with the MOU text publicly released within 48 hours of signing.

Both Trump and Iranian leadership need the ceremony for domestic political reasons that are not symmetric but are simultaneously compelling. Trump needs the July 4 visual. Iran needs the blockade lifted and the assets released. The sabotage risk from Israel is real but is being actively managed by Trump personally. The Monitor predicts the ceremony proceeds barring an Israeli strike on Iranian targets between now and June 19.

2 The MOU text, when released, will contain the \$300 billion investment fund language in a form that benefits Gulf sovereign wealth and U.S. energy company access, not Iranian reparations.

The \$300 billion figure originated as Iran's reparations demand. In the current draft it has been reframed as an international investment fund. The Monitor predicts the released text will show the mechanism structured as facilitated investment access rather than compensation payment — same number, different legal and commercial character. The liability converted to opportunity, as the Monitor identified in Issue Six.

3 The 60-day nuclear negotiations will not produce a final agreement within the window — but will produce a 30-day extension rather than a collapse.

The enrichment red line and the JCPOA trap are structural constraints that 60 days of negotiations cannot resolve. But neither side has an interest in a public collapse during the extension period. The stalling mechanism's behavioral pattern across eight issues is consistent: extend rather than conclude, announce rather than agree, defer rather than resolve. The 60-day window will produce a 30-day extension and a progress narrative.

4 Putin will be publicly credited by Trump for a constructive role in the Iran-Ukraine resolution framework before July 4.

The similar timetable statement remains operative. The architecture's Putin rehabilitation Stage Three — credited statesman at the moment of resolution — is the sequence's next predicted milestone. The G7 provides the stage. The Geneva signing provides the moment. Trump's pattern of crediting Putin publicly is documented across seven issues. The architecture requires it for Board of Peace Russian membership to follow.

5 Israel will not sign onto any element of the Iran MOU framework and will conduct at least one military operation in Lebanon or against Iranian-backed forces before June 30 that Iran will cite as a ceasefire complication.

Ben Gvir has stated the deal does not bind Israel. Katz vowed to retain Lebanon troops. The IDF is "preparing a response" and waiting for a green light that Netanyahu may provide independent of Trump's preferences. Netanyahu's domestic political survival requires demonstrating that Israel has not been fully subordinated to the American deal. A calibrated operation — large enough to demonstrate independence, small enough not to collapse the MOU — is the predicted instrument.

EDITORIAL NOTE — ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE ACCOUNTING

Eight issues of the Architecture Monitor have tracked a framework from its analytical origins through its operational deployment across five theaters and its culminating public moment on June 14. The Monitor's prediction record — 34 confirmed, 1 anomaly refined, 35 resolved entries, 97% — is not the Monitor's most important contribution. The accounting in this issue's Lens section is.

The accounting states what the architecture produced and what it cost, and names the asymmetry between those two columns with the precision eight issues of documented evidence now permits. The architecture's principals are in better financial and institutional position today than they were when the war began. The people who paid for that improvement — American consumers, American allies, Iranian civilians, Palestinian civilians, global agricultural buyers, energy-importing manufacturing economies — are not.

The one-and-a-half-page MOU is a bridge document — a ceasefire and negotiation roadmap, not a completed nuclear agreement. The Monitor has revised its comparative framing accordingly: the right comparison is not MOU versus JCPOA, but final 60-day agreement versus JCPOA. That comparison does not yet exist. What does exist is the cost paid to reach the bridge — documented in full in this issue's accounting section — and the commercial provisions already embedded in the bridge's leaked text: the \$300 billion reconstruction fund that the architecture was designed to capture, confirmed in the draft before the nuclear question is resolved.

The Monitor will be watching what the text says when released. And watching what the 60-day window produces. And watching whether the Geneva ceremony of June 19 delivers the announcement that July 4 requires. And watching, after July 4, whether the architecture's principals have secured what the war was designed to produce. The architecture is visible. The accounting is documented. The 60-day window has just opened.